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The Case of Croatia 
I want to enrich the debate on the future of European integration process 
with a Croatian point of view. I would also like to present an overview of 
Croatia’s position on the prospects for future relations with the EU, as well 
as its role in the region, sometimes called Western Balkans, sometimes 
Southeastern Europe. I would like to use this opportunity to inform you 
about the progress and achievements made by the Republic of Croatia in 
the context of signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement.  
In 1989, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was an euphoria of solidarity 
from the West to the old East. In the next decade, time was spent on utiliz-
ing instruments at hand for the preparation for future membership. The cru-
cial milestone happened after the Washington Summit in 1999 when Po-
land, the Czech Republic and Hungary became members of NATO. This is 
a turning point in the whole process of European enlargement, a guarantee 
of its irreversibility and inevitability. Now, the process of enlargement is 
perceived in a sober way, going step-by-step, too slow with a strong politi-
cal and economic conditionality. However, we must make sure and insist 
that, notwithstanding the results of the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference, 
the Southeastern European countries are true partners and an integral part 
of the future unified Europe. 
For Croatia debates that address the future of Europe are of utmost impor-
tance since we strongly believe that a united Europe without its Southeast-
ern part is not a complete one. As for the dynamics of the present enlarge-
ment, the key date in recent times is the Goteborg European Council 
conclusions, which state that the next enlargement will enable new candi-
dates to take part in the next European Parliament elections, scheduled for 
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June 2004. Regarding the method of the enlargement process, there are two 
main approaches: one that predicts a “big bang“, or the accession of most 
candidate countries at the same time, and the other that supports gradual 
accession of different groups of individual countries. In any case, we are of 
the opinion that the principle of evaluating individual merits of each coun-
try must be maintained. 
The Treaty of Nice has not responded to all of the major expectations that 
were raised during its preparation. Having in mind the practical reforms 
that the Union needs, the adoption of the treaty showed how hard it is to 
change the institutional setup of the EU. However, it provided the basis for 
the European Union to continue to function with its enlarged membership. 
The candidate countries were given a road map and a distribution of votes 
in the Council and a number of seats in the European Parliament were ma-
de to accommodate the new members. 
The fact that the future position of our region within the EU and Croatia’s 
position were not discussed in Nice gives us only more motives to follow 
developments in the EU better in order to secure our position in a united 
Europe. Therefore, we are very much interested that after the 5
th enlarge-
ment the future enlargements of the EU do not stop. We would like to see 
the doors of the future membership open and we do expect equal footing in 
future negotiations for membership within the EU. 
Although there were no concrete discussions and plans for a Europe con-
sisting also of countries of Southeastern Europe at Nice, allow me at this 
point to just briefly present the expectations of the EU membership from 
the Croatian point of view. If we, for example, take into account the size of 
Croatia, once we enter the Union we will probably amount to less than 1% 
of its total population. In accordance with the Nice Treaty and if the institu-
tional mathematics remains the same, we would be entitled to have 12 or 
13 members of the European Parliament, seven votes in the Council, and, at 
least in the first period, no members of the Commission. 
Since this meeting is dealing with the future of integration process in the 
EU, the security aspect of the process should not be sidelined from our a-
genda. With regard to the increasing danger of the scourge of international 
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terrorism, Europe will have to try harder to strengthen its security. In two -
ways: within the framework of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
and also through enhanced military cooperation within the NATO, in order 
to promote solidarity and adequately contribute to the global anti-terrorist 
coalition. 
The new realities that characterize the world today clearly show that vari-
ous forms of integration are taking place in order to ensure a more stable 
and prosperous political and economic environment. The enlarged Europe 
of the future will draw its strength from its unity and the size of the com-
mon market, but also from the respect for cultural and other differences of 
individual peoples. The success of this process in Southeastern Europe de-
pends both on the readiness of the countries in the region to undertake fun-
damental reforms, as well as on the change of perceptions in the Union to-
wards the belief that every European country must be offered the same 
opportunity to join. 
That is a key for understanding the whole process. We have always to keep 
in mind that integration is a two-way street. It is equally valuable to be an 
aspirant for membership, as it is to be the one granting admission. The syn-
ergy that is created in the accession process allows the existing members as 
well as the future members to be mutually more complete and more en-
riched by the enlargement. 
The Croatian government is aware that the enlargement of the EU is neither 
an easy process nor a fast one. Croatia is for various reasons a latecomer to 
the process of EU enlargement. This very fact entails its own shortcomings, 
but also some advantages. The most important advantage is that we are able 
to learn from the experiences of the candidate countries. As for many other 
countries, it is in Croatia's interest to embark upon a path that will, through 
a series of carefully planned and well-performed measures, confirm that it 
is recognized as a true member of the European and world community, 
firmly embedded in the spirit of cooperation, and certain of its rights and 
obligations to that very community.  
In the period after the last year's elections, the Croatian government has 
devoted special attention to its role as a reliable partner to its neighbors and 
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to all other countries it cultivates ties of cooperation with. Its foremost for-
eign policy goals have concentrated on forging closer ties with its partners, 
and on ensuring that processes of both political and economic integration 
proceed unimpeded. Croatia has been admitted to the World Trade Organi-
zation, has continued with negotiations for concluding bilateral free trade 
agreements with EFTA and CEFTA countries, planning to become a 
CEFTA member, and has stepped up its efforts to enter into contractual re-
lations with the European Union. 
The relations between the Republic of Croatia and the European Union ha-
ve taken an upturn. This year we saw a turning point in the development of 
Croatia's relations with the EU. It began with intense negotiations with the 
European Commission in connection with the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA). The negotiations were successfully concluded in the 
very short time of only five months. The Stabilization and Association 
Agreement with the European Union was initiated in May 2001 and signed 
in October 2001 in Luxembourg. This is the first bilateral agreement ever 
concluded between the EU and Croatia. The significance of this agreement 
establishing legal and contractual relations with the EU is so much bigger 
since it is not only the first formal step in institutionalizing the relations 
with the EU, but also marks the beginning of preparations of Croatia for 
EU membership, which is our priority political goal.  
The Stabilization and Association Agreement is a new type of association 
agreement, which has two major differences from the Europe Agreements: 
it contains the stabilization element and the title on regional co-operation. 
This is understandable, taking into account the need to attain and maintain 
both political and economic stability in the sometimes tragically volatile 
region of Southeastern Europe. The Agreement defines the relationship be-
tween Croatia and the EU in all three pillars of the EU – the European 
Community and its economic aspects, the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs area. The adjustments that the 
Agreement requires from Croatia are meeting the Copenhagen criteria, le-
gal harmonization and readiness to contribute to regional cooperation and 
stability.  
  8 
The Case of Croatia 
The importance of this first agreement, which establishes contractual rela-
tions between Croatia and the EU, is still impossible to assess. The SAA is 
not only the first formal step in the establishment of Croatia's relations with 
the EU, but it also marks the beginning of comprehensive reforms and pre-
parations of the Republic of Croatia for its full membership in the EU. Mo-
reover, the SAA gives us a development and progress perspective, which 
will have a significant impact on all aspects of life in our country. 
Let me point out what is on the Croatian schedule for the near future. Croa-
tia is first and foremost facing an extensive activity in the field of harmoni-
zation of Croatian legislation with that of the EU. According to the stipula-
tions of the SAA, the priority areas of harmonization are the following: 
freedom of market competition, state subsidies, intellectual, industrial and 
commercial property rights, public procurement, standardization and me-
trology, and consumer protection. Additionally, an agreement has been 
reached on the obligations of Croatia to simplify and make more transpar-
ent the procedure for acquiring real estate in Croatia for the citizens of the 
EU member states. The SAA envisages for the Republic of Croatia to 
gradually harmonize the regulations from the above areas with the corre-
sponding EU regulations. The transitional periods for the harmonization of 
the Croatian legislation will last between three and five years, depending 
on the area. The total transitional period for acquiring a complete level of 
compliance required for associate membership of Croatia shall last at ma-
ximum six years. 
Croatia also needs to work on the fulfillment of the issues highlighted by 
the political part of the agreement, notably the regional cooperation com-
ponent. Within the scope of the agreement this means a readiness to con-
clude bilateral conventions with the countries included in the Stabilization 
and Association Process, but also with candidates for EU accession. These 
conventions will be primarily aimed at strengthening bilateral economic 
relations and mutual free trade, but will be devoid of any pressure to enter 
into any kind of multilateral or new state-building associations in this re-
gion. 
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Croatia is and will remain determined and committed to substantially con-
tribute to the development of regional co-operation and to the stabilization 
of the region. This is not only our formal obligation stemming from the 
Stabilization and Association Agreement, but it is also a priority in the for-
eign policy of the Croatian government. Croatia needs an economically and 
politically stable neighborhood to the same extent as the EU needs it. This 
is why there should be no doubt about the future regional intentions and 
actions of Croatia in Southeastern Europe. 
Let me just briefly focus on the trade aspects of current and future eco-
nomic relations in the region. In our view, a strategic commitment to de-
velop regional cooperation can best be highlighted in the area of trade pol-
icy by pursuing regional trade arrangements promoted and supported by the 
Stability Pact in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Liberalization 
and Facilitation of Trade. Croatia has signed the Memorandum together 
with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Macedonia 
and Romania.  
It confirms Croatia's commitment to develop and implement the network of 
bilateral agreements on free trade of goods by the end of 2002, which 
would be in line with the rules and discipline of the WTO, as well as with 
the relations established by the countries of the region with the EU. By 
agreeing to create such a free-trade environment in the southeast of Europe, 
Croatia has sent a clear message that we stand ready to cooperate with all 
countries in the region and contribute to the reconstruction of their econo-
mies by rebuilding and reinforcing trade relations in the region. 
We have, however, often been invited to take a step beyond a network of 
bilateral agreements on free trade and proposed to participate in creating a 
common economic space or customs union in the Balkans. It is too ambi-
tious by any standards and therefore it is a highly unrealistic project. Croa-
tia does not see any economic or political reasons to support this idea. One 
has definitely to draw a line between efficient and inefficient solutions, be-
tween ambitions and reality, between regional cooperation and attempts to 
create new state-related associations in the Balkans. For us, this line goes 
straight between a network of bilateral free trade agreements on the one 
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hand, and the customs union on the other. The customs union is an unac-
ceptable solution to Croatia. 
Everything the customs union could offer to companies and countries from 
the economic and trade-related point of view is equally achievable through 
a network of bilateral agreements on free trade. Even establishing such a 
network of bilateral agreements on free trade is an extremely complex af-
fair. This leads us to the conclusion that it is much more productive and 
realistic to contemplate how the economies of Southeastern Europe can be-
come integrated to a much larger extent and at a faster pace with the united 
economies, legislation, standards and criteria of the European Union, than 
to try figure out how to realize a Balkan-oriented economic self-
sufficiency. 
An evolvement of bilateral free trade agreements into a single, multilateral 
agreement on a free trade area may contribute to that goal, especially if all 
countries of Southeastern Europe could become CEFTA members at an 
accelerated pace. In that case they should extend credible assurances that 
rules of origin system can function free of abuse on this multilateral level, 
and confirm their readiness to carry out liberalized, transparent and predict-
able trade policies by joining the World Trade Organization. This proposal 
could also contribute to keeping long-term prospects of CEFTA, by shifting 
its membership to a southeast geographical direction at the time when most 
of the present day members would become EU member states. 
In this respect, it must be noted that there is still a great difference in the 
development of various Southeastern European countries. While Croatia 
has approximately 4500 USD GDP per capita, other countries range be-
tween 800 and 1400 USD. However, we have already shown that we are 
ready for regional economic cooperation, particularly in liberalizing trade 
within the region. To this end, we have signed the Free Trade Agreements 
with Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Hungary, Poland, EFTA 
countries, as well as a Memorandum of Understanding on trade liberaliza-
tion and facilitation in SEE, in which the seven countries of SEE agreed to 
create a network of FTAs by end of 2002. Also, Croatia will soon become a 
member of CEFTA.  
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Although with the fall of Milosevic the security situation in the region has 
significantly improved, problems, such as in Macedonia, continued even 
without him. We hope and expect the implementation of the Framework 
Agreement, which will lead to full normalization in Macedonia. We look 
forward to the efforts of the new Albanian government in making visible 
and continuous progress in its institutional and economic development. In 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation is still complex; with the Dayton 
structure constantly showing its ups and downs, but the new coalition gov-
ernment “Alliance” must be supported. In the Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia, there are fundamental questions of the constitutional arrangements 
as well as on the status of Montenegro, Kosovo and even Vojvodina. Given 
such a varying situation in these countries, it requires a tailor-made ap-
proach by the EU.  
Another important aspect to the integration process will surely be the im-
pact of the Euro. In this field, the region is maybe closer to the EU than in 
political terms. In Bosnia and Herzegovina convertible mark is already a 
legal currency. The Euro will be directly introduced in Kosovo, and per-
haps in Montenegro. At our northern borders, Hungary and Slovenia are 
doing their best to enter the EMU. The Euro may prove to be an important 
cohesive element to bridge the gap between the rich West and the poor 
South. 
Only after the signing of the agreement does the real work begin on the im-
plementation of both what has been agreed to and to work on other condi-
tions for full-fledged EU membership. Crucial for our further relations with 
the EU is the implementation of the commitments that ensue from the 
agreement. More importantly, the SAA is a starting point for a gradual but 
ever-deeper and infinite Europeanization of Croatia. The SAA is not a 
longer-term alternative to the EU membership. It is a stepping-stone for 
membership, and is only perceived as such in Croatia. It is our intention to 
work in parallel on meeting the conditions for associate membership as 
well as on adjusting our entire political and economic system to meet the 
criteria for full-fledged membership. From the very start, we shall imple-
ment these two phases on the way to European union simultaneously, even 
though they are separate in procedural terms. 
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The Croatian government recently – and for the first time – publicly as-
sessed its own ability as well as the ability of Croatian society to implement 
everything that adjustment to EU criteria entails. To that end the Govern-
ment has made public its objective to ensure that Croatia is ready for full 
EU membership by the end of 2006. This is ambitious but also a realistic 
goal. The government has not conjectured on when the Republic of Croatia 
will become a full member of the EU, because we are aware that this does 
not depend solely on our performance, but rather on the EU’s institutional 
capacity to admit new members.  
At its October session, the Croatian government adopted the Implementa-
tion Plan for the Stabilization and Association Agreement, which consists 
of 338 measures marking the beginning of comprehensive reforms aimed at 
harmonization with the EU's legal, economic and political standards. This 
will require efficient coordination, implementation follow-up and definition 
of national strategies and actions. The objective is to be ready for member-
ship by the end of 2006. In order to underpin the effects of reforms, we in-
tend to fully explore the CARDS programme, and we expect further bilat-
eral assistance for institutional, economic, social and legal reforms. 
But when we will achieve the necessary level of readiness for EU member-
ship in 2006, this will signify a comprehensive change in the conditions 
and quality of life, work and economic activity in Croatia. This is why the 
date of Croatia’s formal entry into the EU as a member will then no longer 
be as important, for already such a virtual membership will satisfy most 
development interests of Croatia and its citizens. Therefore, we are not em-
barking on the way to Europe and the achievement of European criteria just 
to gain EU membership as a goal unto itself, but primarily to satisfy and 
achieve our own development goals. 
To speculate today on the rate and direction of the EU enlargement process 
is a thankless task. Perhaps the most feasible scenario is one where several 
of today’s most advanced candidates join the EU by about 2004 or 2005. 
This means that the EU, by its next Intergovernmental Conference in 2004, 
should make clear its position on the grouping and re-grouping of the re-
maining candidates and the possible addition of new candidates. This 
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should be dependent upon the level of individual readiness for membership 
that potential candidates will have demonstrated by then. This is where 
Croatia’s chance lies, but this also represents a great obligation not to miss 
such an opportunity. 
The best way for Croatia and other countries in the region is to secure EU 
membership through its own unilateral activities and decisiveness in im-
plementing the program of reforms, regardless of the formal course of EU 
enlargement. We do not have to and we actually cannot compete with other 
candidate countries in this process, but must compete with and outdo our-
selves in developing our own capabilities to achieve the necessary level of 
adjustment. 
Such an approach is a sufficiently ambitious, but also a sufficiently realistic 
one. It is the best way to highlight the different levels of readiness of the 
countries involved in the Stabilization and Association Process. It reaffirms 
the possibility of adopting an individual rather than a regional progress to-
ward EU membership. I hope this will also make it possible for Croatia to 
quickly join the current candidate countries. According to a public opinion 
poll that the Ministry for European Integration conducted in June of 2001, 
this is supported and desired by 75% of Croatia’s citizens.  
I would hereby like to emphasize that a high level of coordination and co-
operation with the entire state administration, universities, nongovernmen-
tal organizations and professional associations, as well as independent ex-
perts from many other institutions was achieved during the negotiations for 
the SAA. It is the coordination and cooperation that represent our major 
success, i.e. the mobilization of all creative forces in Croatia for the pur-
pose of achieving our common goal – a path towards the full membership 
in the EU. Consequently, the SAA is the result of all the efforts, as well as 
numerous and intensive consultations of all the participants, which is a pre-
condition for the success of the entire process. Meanwhile, our task is to 
increase our visibility in Europe, and still to challenge the EU to realize 
that a country that went into transition and simultaneously fought in war is 
a very serious candidate for EU membership. 
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Regarding the ongoing debate on the future of Europe, we would like to see 
Europe more united around common goals and methods of integration sin-
ce only such an attitude can secure its position as a global and influential 
player in international relations. We are presented with a great challenge, 
but also with a great responsibility and obligation not to miss the present 
generation’s best opportunity.  
To conclude, I would like to thank the organizer - ZEI - by saying that 
meetings and conferences like this one can generate ideas and facilitate the 
sharing of experiences in the EU enlargement process. Only through pro-
fessional and organized work can we close the gap in relations with the EU. 
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The Case of Bulgaria 
The discussion today on such a fascinating topic as our vision for the future 
of the European Union, is natural to the expectations of our peoples to en-
joy the benefits of peace, stability and prosperity across Europe. 
Bulgaria in its position of a candidate country recognizes the importance of 
the debate on the future of the European Union. The Bulgarian side has al-
ready launched and actively seeks to stimulate the further wide-ranging 
discussion on a national level. 
We appreciate the intention to be associated with the debate in an appropri-
ate way. The debate seems necessary since there has not yet been a broad 
public discussion on the future integration process in the accession coun-
tries. 
Bulgaria’s target date to conclude the accession negotiations is the year 
2004 at the latest. It reflects not only the realistic assessment of the pro-
gress in our preparation for EU membership, but also our willingness to be 
fully involved in the final stage of the debate. 
As representative of a candidate country I strongly believe that we are ca-
pable of building together a clear, pragmatic and realistic vision of our 
common future in the framework of a strong and effective European Union. 
The Bulgarians hope that there will not be any delay in the ratification pro-
cess of the Treaty of Nice, which clearly states the EU’s political will is for 
successful conclusion of the enlargement and consolidation of the integra-
tion process.  
It is important for us that the provisions of the Treaty of Nice on the repre-
sentation of the candidate countries in the institutional model of the Euro-
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pean Union stay the basis for our participation in the decision making proc-
ess in the EU after accession. 
The Bulgarian side emphasizes the open character of the debate on the fu-
ture of the EU. We believe that there is a need not of a static final goal of 
the integration process, but of a shared will for deepening of the integra-
tion. The development of a pragmatic and realistic basis should be of key 
importance for the EU. 
We support the wider application of the “community method”, which is the 
very essence of the integration mechanism. It can gain a new dynamics 
when it is combined with enhanced forms of intergovernmental cooperation 
in areas which require determined support from the member states. 
It is important for us that the deepening of the integration process will al-
ways be possible while respecting the national specifics and preserving its 
open character. The extension of the application of the qualified majority 
voting and the simplified differentiated procedure for enhanced cooperation 
form are the necessary preconditions for it. 
Bulgaria believes that the European Union should be a union of nations 
which voluntarily delegate part of their sovereignty to institutions at com-
munity level. We are confident that this is a reliable way to guarantee our 
national interest by identifying it with the achievements and interests of a 
strong political and economic union. 
Participation in the Preparatory Process 
The classically applied method of a intergovernmental conference for a re-
vision of the treaties is practically inapplicable in terms of participation of 
future member states, even concluded negotiations. 
Future members should be fully involved from the very beginning in the 
preparatory work on the ground of political rather than of formal reasons. 
As we may recall, our joint efforts contributed to resolve the Kosovo crisis 
Bulgaria demonstrated political responsibility without referring to any for-
mal reason, such as not being a member of EU and NATO. Our solidarity 
with the international community at that time was duly acknowledged. 
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Bulgaria supports the creation of a broad and open preparatory convention, 
similar to the convention which worked out the European Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. However, this convention should include the member 
states and the candidates on an equal footing. Europe should not miss the 
opportunity to enhance democracy and build the common house together 
with its future inhabitants. We are indeed to be inhabitants rather than ten-
ants. 
We support also the combination of working methods, composed of the 
principal of the largest representation of different EU institutions in candi-
date states, endorsed by expert groups. This would take into consideration 
the requirement both for an extended basis of participation and precision 
and profundity in achieving and presenting draft amendments of the trea-
ties, which are of constitutional character. 
The convention’s agenda must include the four issues of the post-Nice 
agenda as well as other pressing institutional concerns. The accession coun-
tries should have the opportunity to express their opinions. They also 
should be represented in the convention’s presidium. The preparation of the 
convention will also require a strong leadership, because it covers a broader 
area of competencies compared to the Convention for the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights. 
Position on the Content 
The list of issues enumerated in the Declaration of the Future of the Union 
must be not exhaustive in terms of the real debate’s content. They are spe-
cifying the main directions of the discussion. The real debate should also 
include problems of main public concern, such as unemployment, comba-
ting trans-border crimes, illegal immigration and traffic of human beings, 
consumer protection and strengthening the EU role as an actor in the areas 
of foreign policy and defense. Especially after the terrorist act of Septem-
ber 11
th, 2001 in the USA, it is extremely important to deepen the 
involvement of future member states in the formulation and implementa-
tion of the external and internal security policies. 
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It is obligatory to strengthen the common work in the field of Justice and 
Home affairs and to improve the coherence and coordination of CFSP and 
JHA. 
The member states have to find the right formula in order to involve the 
future member states in the ESDP-architecture and to insure their effective 
participation in the decision-shaping process. 
Being from the southern part of Europe, I want to underline how important 
it would be to formulate and adopt a southern dimension if the politicians 
from member states and candidate countries want to contribute to the future 
stability in Southeastern Europe. 
Speaking about strengthening the cooperation in the field CFSP and ESDP 
it is of great importance neither to weaken the transatlantic solidarity nor to 
discourage future enlargement of the NATO as a today’s mid-term and 
long-term guarantor for the stability. 
The so-called delimitation of competencies between the European Union 
and the member states would affect the very basis of the Union institutional 
model. The explicit definition and differentiation of competencies may not 
be the appropriate approach. It seems essential to preserve the possibility of 
gradual transfer of powers from national to community and union level. 
This would imply a preservation of the dynamics of the integration process 
and would allow maintaining of a flexible and open community system. 
We think that the simplification of the founding treaties could not be im-
perative and a task for it’s own sake. The community law is a result of a 
unique process of evolution and reflects the balance of interests of member 
states – the essence of the integration mechanism. The adoption of a single 
simplified and fundamental text of constitutional nature would provide for 
consolidation of the evolutionary acquis communautaire. 
The constitutional treaty should be in a sense that:  
-  It integrates all essential constituent provisions of the current treaties 
in a first constitutional part. A separate non-constitutional part should 
include technological provisions and provisions related to the imple-
mentation. 
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-  Europe’s public and citizens are involved in its formulation, discus-
sion and debate. 
-  To incorporate a revised Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
-  To define the EU’s competencies and institutions. 
Bulgaria highly appreciates the elaboration of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and welcomes its innovative nature. We are aware of the fact that 
though the EU institutions, as well as the present and future member states, 
are not withstanding the nature of the Charter as a legally binding docu-
ment or political act, they will perceive it as acquis communautaire. 
National parliaments have a major role to play in the process of shaping the 
decisions on community level, mostly by defining the positions of member 
states. Seeking of the integration of the national parliaments in the Euro-
pean Union’s institutional structure would be hardly compatible with the 
present stage of its evolution and the institutional balance of the Union. The 
Main direction of reinforcing the role of national parliaments should be 
their better information and consultation by the national governments on 
the ongoing decision making process and the evolution of Union’s policies, 
in compliance with their specific national political systems. 
Discussing today the future of the European Union and the future enlarge-
ment process, all the politicians and people involved in the preparation of 
the Convention and the next IGC have to be very strong and to work with 
the ambition not to change the principles adopted in Helsinki and the con-
clusions from Nice in order to avoid the risk of establishing a new dividing 
lines. 
I’m not very happy to say this, but the exact date of the first accession de-
pends very much on the political decision of EU member states and their 
calculations how to group candidates. Different scenarios are under discus-
sion – one of them is the so-called “big bang” of ten countries. I don’t wont 
to say that this is dangerous scenario, but I have to admit that it’s a risky 
one, because without any clear guarantee for Bulgaria it will delay the ac-
cession of our country and will contribute to the growth of the euro-
skepticism. I’m sure that the EU itself will suffer if Bulgaria, one of the 
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most stable states in Southeastern Europe, becomes economically unstable 
with weak democratic institutions. This can only contribute to the further 
partition of the region into ethnically capsulated enclaves, which may trans-
form the Balkan peninsula into the “Balkan islands”.  
In discussing the European project today, we have to be optimistic. This 
means not to draw shadow scenarios, but to stimulate the preparation of the 
convention and the next IGC with the main aim to contribute to a strong 
and united Europe. 
During the next months and years before the next IGC, we will have to dis-
cuss together in many occasions all the issues touched today, and I will be 
happy if we can do our best for the preparation of the decision makers. 
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The Case of Lithuania 
This colloquium takes place at a right time. The Progress Reports and the 
Strategy Paper for Enlargement have been released just a couple of days 
ago. We are in a year’s time from the end of accession negotiations and the 
beginning of the ratification process. Exactly in a month, the European 
Council in Laeken will set up the convention to debate the future of the 
European Union. Thus, we have to praise the initiative of the Centre for 
European Integration Studies in Bonn for bringing this group to address the 
issues that will be increasingly important in the run up to the IGC 2004.  
My intervention would consists of two major parts: firstly, I would like to 
make few points on the enlargement process and then, secondly, to give 
you some insights how we in Lithuania see the evolving discussions on the 
finalities of the EU.  
Enlargement: First Thing First 
My starting point is that enlargement is fundamentally linked to the ques-
tion of the future of the Union. My logic here is simple – only successful 
enlargement can bring about the success of the future of the Union. There-
fore the sub-title of the Commission’s strategy paper - “making success of 
enlargement” - does perfectly reflect the call of the day. I would point out 
just three elements: 
-  completion of accession negotiations in time is imperative. Sticking to 
so called road map should make it possible to conclude negotiations 
with the most advanced countries – including Lithuania - by the end of 
2002 so that they can become members of the EU in 2004; 
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-  the EU financial framework agreed to in Berlin in 1999 provides a 
sufficient basis for the accession of up to ten new member states. 
Again - it is a strategic confirmation. We all understand the sensitivi-
ties related to the financial issues;  different assumptions will be scru-
tinized and different suggestions might be discussed but the point of 
departure is right;  
-  next related point: reforms of EU policies or institutions should not 
hinder or slow down EU enlargement. The processes of accession and 
reforms/reviews of policies should be kept distinct. This is very im-
portant as regards negotiations on agriculture and regional policy, 
which constitute the main part of the EU’s budget.  
Clearly, the “homework” of the candidate countries is a conditio sine qua 
non. On the other hand, achievements of the transition process must also be 
recognized: over the past decade, countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
have made an unprecedented effort on the road to peaceful and essential 
transformation.  
European integration has been a guiding principle to this. And the eco-
nomic outlook of Lithuania is rather clear: privatization is nearly over; 
about 70 per cent of GDP is now generated by the private sector. The eco-
nomic structure of Lithuania has become similar to that of the EU member 
states: services account for 60% of GDP, industry for a quarter of GDP, 
agriculture for 7.5%. GDP is rising 4-5% annually – twice as much as the 
EU average. Exports to the EU have been rising, thus testifying to the abil-
ity to withstand the competitive pressures. 
There is another side – or shall we say: price? – to these achievements. Un-
employment has been rising and it is nearly two times higher than the aver-
age in the EU. Unemployment is acute in rural areas, which in the case of 
Lithuania accounts for a fifth of the total workforce. Tight budgetary poli-
cies have restricted spending for social needs. Not surprisingly, sectors of 
social protection, health care, education are the most sensitive in terms of 
reforms. Economic and social transformation is not free of political costs. 
Popular opinion in the candidate countries relate these costs to the Euro-
pean integration often more than they are related in reality. We in Lithuania 
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have been telling different interest groups and society at large that it is us 
who need reforms more than the Union or “Brussels”. But many around 
this table can perhaps agree that this message is not that easy to get across 
to people’s minds. 
Thus it is not surprising that in a country like Lithuania the enlargement 
debate and the debate about the future of Europe are not only closely inter-
linked but that the issues of enlargement are also taking precedence. To put 
it the other way: our domestic discussion concentrates more on the future in 
Europe rather than the future of Europe. Accession negotiations, discus-
sions on the costs and benefits of the membership attract close public atten-
tion. It became increasingly obvious at the present stage of negotiations 
with sensitive issues being laid on the table.  
Up till now public support for the EU has been sustained in Lithuania. 
Opinion polls show that the support for the membership among our popula-
tion is slowly but steadily increasing. It stands at around 50%. Recently we 
tried another interesting approach: people were asked how they would de-
scribe the EU if it were a person. About 80% of the respondents gave a 
positive description saying that it is an honest, reliable, just and clever per-
son. However, in addition to being described as a big and decent friend, it 
was also perceived as a selfish manager. 
So resentments about “the long way” to EU membership are present in the 
East. Fears about “the cost of enlargement” are heard in the West (where 
else, if not in Germany, are these feelings so well known?). Against this 
background, I find it extremely important that the enlargement issues 
would also be debated in the EU member countries. Needless to say - suc-
cess of enlargement depends on a public support and the current levels of 
public support among the EU 15 are not encouraging. The argument that 
enlargement is about investment, that short-term costs will be by far out-
weighed by long-term benefits will have to be repeated time and again both 
in the East and West, South and North of Europe. Political leadership is 
needed for this and not another dramatic reminder that we cannot take our 
security or prosperity for granted. Integration is the best response to inter-
nal or external challenges. More Europe – not less.  
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And the final observation at this point: the enlargement process must re-
main inclusive. There are important suggestions to that end in the Enlarge-
ment Strategy Paper. Whatever scenario becomes true in a year or two 
countries that are not part of the first round of enlargement should be given 
their fair chance. The stabilization process in Southeast Europe will be 
evolving into pre-accession and then accession track. On the other hand, “a 
new neighborhood policy” should also be expanded. There is a clear need 
to cooperate with future border regions of the enlarged EU – the regions to 
which enlargement of the EU will open new economic opportunities. Since 
Lithuania’s eastern border will become a part of the Union’s external bor-
der we are particularly interested in regional cooperation (e.g. Northern 
Dimension). This topic is also a priority of the Lithuanian chairmanship in 
the Council of Europe. 
Ideas and Principles of the Common Future 
Before moving to some of the issues of the ‘future of Europe’ debate I 
would like to make the following remarks:  
It is not the enlargement that has triggered this debate and further reforms 
of the Union. I counter the opinion that enlargement is the cause of all the 
changes – and nobody likes changes - that the Union has to undergo. The 
Union has been in the constant process of change since the very beginning. 
Enlargement is part of the change, but so is inherent logic of its develop-
ment. The Union is under outside pressures of globalization and that – to 
my mind - is among the primary reasons for  further European consolida-
tion.  
For the candidate countries participation in this debate is an important 
learning process. We have to recapitulate the post-war integrationist dis-
course. We have to become part of it; finally, we have the problem of the 
vocabulary. It is absolutely clear that the notions of ‘federation’ or ‘consti-
tution’, ‘solidarity’ or ‘division of competences’ have quite a different 
meaning for different participants of the debate. 
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Having said that, the questions that will have to be addressed in the course 
of the debate in a run up to the IGC 2004 and in the IGC itself are what ob-
jectives and common policies will be vested in the future European Union 
(what do we do together?). What institutional arrangements would serve 
those policies and overall objectives best? How it is all to be financed? 
Firstly, through the years of its existence, the European Union has proven 
that the objectives and the policies of the founders of the EC set forth in the 
Fifties and Sixties – the stability of the continent and the welfare of its citi-
zens – are all alive. I would not put that to question. For me they continue 
to be fully relevant. And once again, the enlargement of the EU is the im-
plementation of these objectives. If one looks at the preambles of the 
founding treaties or founding principles of the communities there is little to 
add to it. The dilemmas of “communitarianism” and “intergovernamental-
ism” will not be “resolved” in one or two IGCs or by making a great leap to 
a totally new constitutional design. This dualism is an unique characteristic 
of the whole project and what is impressive to those of us who have been 
observing it for the outside is that it works. At least it has worked out so 
far. I think that the Union can register many more successes than failures 
over its relatively short history. It is always easier to focus on the latter as 
well as to be skeptical. For that you do not have to promote, to believe, to 
aspire.  
The principle of subsidiarity is as relevant as ever. At the turn of the cen-
tury, it is still true that the most effective decisions are made at the level 
(regional, national or Union) which serves implementation and is closest to 
the citizens.  
Common EU areas and policies – single market, including free movement 
of goods, services, capital and persons or single currency have proven their 
worth. Their evolution should continue together with social protection and 
infrastructure of economics such as energy, transport or environment.  
The global role of the Union calls for new avenues for common policies 
such as common EU foreign and security policy, justice and home affairs. 
The EU has been seeking to develop and will continue to develop a 
stronger identity in global politics, while the third pillar should gradually 
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evolve into a community policy. In the candidate countries – I suppose – 
we are somewhat more at ease with the dynamic evolution of these two pil-
lars. Why? Because this decade (of exciting change of the EU agenda and 
consequently of these two policies) has coincided with our pre-accession 
efforts. In a way we were exposed to these developments right from the 
outset and we do not bear the memories of the European political coopera-
tion or of the different sensitivities related to Schengen Agreement still at 
the time when it had a life of its own.   
Naturally, Lithuania has a special interest that EU builds a solid eastern as 
well as northern dimension. Baltic Sea cooperation also has an immense 
potential.   Lithuania will contribute to it with its knowledge of the region 
also making sure that borders although fully protected and controlled are 
not iron barriers to our neighbors. I think Lithuania’s good cooperation 
with its neighbors is well recognized, including different projects with the 
Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation.  
Among the important questions is how the founding principle of solidarity 
will be applied in an enlarged Union. Our reasoning here is one of analogy. 
If cohesion and structural policies accelerated the growth of Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal and Greece then why this should not repeat in the Baltic States or 
elsewhere? And solidarity should mean solidarity also from those who have 
been able to benefit from it over decades. In other words, credibility of the 
European integration rests on the degree in which its successes are given 
the means and conditions to be repeated in the expanded Union.  
Bigger or smaller - the European Union will need a budget. Since the ques-
tion about how the enlargement is financed is a fundamental issue and it 
will have to be addressed, it would also be sensible to look at the bigger 
picture and think whether it is a right moment to consider a gradual reform 
of the EU financing and budgeting. Perhaps time has come to take a closer 
look at the possibilities of guaranteeing the EU institutions more independ-
ent sources of income than the budgets of the member states. 
One requirement, however, here should be a clear linkage between the pre-
sent and the future. People are allergic to futurology. Real people see real 
problems, which should, in their view, be necessarily addressed. Perhaps 
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this is a very simplified but a “real” rephrase of what we call legitimacy. 
Democratic legitimacy of the Union is something that will be evolving over 
longer time and it will have to face not only all the ‘traditional’ components 
of representation, circulation of power and social acceptance, etc. but also 
the changing nature of democracy (one may wish to discuss the case of ref-
erendum in Ireland) and social organization. 
Secondly, European institutions – for me - are a derivation of the objec-
tives. There is hardly a need for a “revolution” in the way the Council, Par-
liament, Commission, Court and other institutions interact. The institutions 
have to evolve gradually, the same way as the objectives of the EU are 
evolving – but that does not mean that there should be no change. Things 
can always be done better and ongoing reviews of the EU governance and 
on the Council functioning are good examples that there is a room for im-
proving, for running the enterprise more efficiently.  
Lithuanian thinking rests on simple but tested experiences. Again - the 
communitarian method that has made the EU what it is today means for us 
that we are talking about a Union that accommodates the big and protects 
the small. Not the other union that we had the misfortune to test for fifty 
years. Strong institutions guarantee a fair game. That’s what we learned 
from the textbooks. That’s something that seems to work well in accession 
negotiations. Stronger institutions underlie the cohesion of the Union and 
have so far been the main “engine” of European integration. Arguing for 
strengthening of the inter-governmentalism at the expense of communitari-
anism is, to a large extent, an attempt in a way to turn the integration clock 
backwards. Thus the community method must be preserved, strengthened 
and extended as the EU enlarges. 
Of course, in some cases the intergovernmental method might also be 
needed. Perhaps on the ‘questions of war and peace’ it may be the only way 
where a supra-national method cannot be introduced for the time being or 
at all.  
The dilemma of these two methods can be further addressed by a clearer 
delimitation of competencies. The division of power should not, therefore, 
be limited to the principle of subsidiarity but must also say which issues 
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and areas pertaining to the European competencies are bound to be dealt 
with in a communitarian way and which should be left for intergovernmen-
tal cooperation. Such a division should be accompanied by a common un-
derstanding that European integration has not reached its limits and should 
thus be pursued further. In any case, different operating modes for the Un-
ion need be considered on the basis of functional needs depending on the 
Union's objectives, areas and scope of action, rather than seen as an ideo-
logical shibboleth. 
Of course, the structure of 25 and more nations will be large and not easy 
to govern. But our union must be functioning. Alternatives to that are very, 
very bleak. Sovereignty is not in question here. From the 15th to the 18th 
century, the Lithuanian and the Polish Commonwealth was governed by the 
principle of veto (liberum veto!): for that time it was democracy and sover-
eignty at its extremes. It was nice at the beginning but led to a catastrophe 
of the state later on. That was the end of sovereignty. Thus, from its own 
history Lithuania knows that too much vetoes don’t work. We realize that 
more and more areas of European common policy can be exempted from 
the veto right in the future. On both sides of the enlargement we shall be 
moving towards the qualified majority voting (QMV).  
Representing your ‘national’ interests is one more thing which we have to 
discuss in the context of the policy reforms or application of the QMV in 
the enlarged Union. It is my conviction that interests of the new member 
states would fit into the general composition of interests of the present Un-
ion. Among the countries that are joining the Union there are countries that 
are more free traders (and free marketiers) and those that are more protec-
tionist; there are Protestant and Catholic; there are southern and nearly 
‘northern’ countries; there are also small and big ones. I say this because I 
believe that the national interests can be and will be integrated into the ex-
isting EU fabric, and in a similar way that decisions in the EU were never 
taken on “big vs. small” basis we will not be seeing “old vs. new” voting 
whatever the voting procedures or weighting of votes may suggest. Look at 
the accession negotiations or the whole of the accession process starting 
with the Europe Agreements. I have a difficulty in recalling a coordinated 
action – speaking one voice – from the side of acceding countries. I do not 
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believe that membership in the Union would foster the Eastern and Central 
European “newcomers club”. 
Diversity of the European Union is bound to produce various initiatives of 
smaller groups of countries who later offer their experiences to the entire 
Union. Such initiatives are legitimized under the title of "enhanced co-
operation" and have, throughout modern history, served as motor of Euro-
pean integration. But, however good this arrangement is, we may need a 
safeguard for it not to break loose and fall out off our hands. Exclusive 
clubs or centres or cores should not threaten solidarity. They should not 
lead us into a European Union which has two standards, two policies, two 
governments, two budgets – one for the selected, rich and lucky, and the 
other for the rest. We have to strive at a coherent European Union. We un-
derstand enhanced cooperation as an inclusive process in the spirit of Jean 
Monnet. The rules of enhanced co-operation as laid out in Amsterdam and 
Nice can be effectively used. The enhanced co-operation should be an in-
strument of integration, not exclusion. 
Before concluding, a few remarks on the state of the debate in Lithuania. 
The Lithuanian Foreign Minister and members of Parliament have initiated 
discussions covering various aspects pertaining to future shape and policies 
of the Union with various interest groups, youth organizations, political 
parties and other segments of civil society. The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
has a personal commitment to induce discussion inside the country. The 
President will be launching the civic society forum early next year. A group 
of scholars also charted their visions on the future of the European Union 
sector-wise and as a whole.  
Participation of candidate countries in the workings of Convention is also 
crucial for legitimizing the debate itself. It is also an important beginning of 
the bigger Union’s functioning. I would not overestimate the formal part of 
the process; however, it is my strong belief that accession treaties will be 
signed well before the end of the Convention and Lithuanian participants 
will be endorsing the final document with a feeling of good accomplish-
ment. We know the Union that was started by J. Monnet, R. Schuman, A. 
de Gaspery, W. Hallstein and others. We know the Union that was build 
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further by generation of F. Mitterrand, H. Kohl and J. Delors. Now is the 
turn for G. Schröder and P. Lipponen, T. Blair and L. Jospin, as well as A. 
Kwasniewski, V. Vike-Freiberga and V. Havel . 
At the end of the day it is all about responsibility. I would like to testify 
here that the closer countries of Central and Eastern Europe are coming to 
the day of EU membership, the more we contemplate our responsibility. It 
is with this feeling that we have to continue the European adventure. 
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The Case of Slovakia 
Twelve years will have elapsed on November 17 since the day when the 
Slovaks and Czechs made the first step on their way to democracy. At the 
same time those events opened the door for these two nations of Central 
Europe to the European Union which, I hope, Slovakia will join very soon. 
Accession of Slovakia to the EU will so button up the effort that started at 
the November evening twelve years ago. 
Slovakia welcomed the Declaration on the Future of the European Union 
adopted in Nice which asked member states as well as candidate countries 
to open a wide debate on the future shape of the union. We are aware that 
there are a lot of challenges which the EU must face at the threshold of the 
new millennium. Globalization, forthcoming unprecedented enlargement of 
the Union, elimination of the so-called democratic deficit of the European 
institutions were just the main challenges that initiated the debate on the 
future of the EU. In September, these challenges have been joined by a new 
one - terrorism as a threat to global stability, security and peace, and in a 
wider context also as a threat to freedom and democracy. 
National Convention on the European Future of Slova-
kia and the European Convention 
The debate on the future of the European Union has two dimensions: a na-
tional one and a European one. 
In Slovakia we have been inspired by the positive example of the conven-
tion which worked at the text of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, and so we have created the National Convention on 
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the European Future of Slovakia. This is a platform for the nation-wide dis-
cussion on the future of the EU from the Slovak point of view. It has no 
rigid internal organizational structures. The moderator of  meetings is the 
State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Jan Fige. Certain co-
ordinating work is carried out by a working group of the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs. The National Convention associates the representatives from 
various spheres of our society. It comprises representatives of parliamen-
tary political parties, non-governmental organizations, the church, the aca-
demic field and self-government. The ambition of the National Convention 
is to initiate a wide debate on the issues concerning the future of Europe 
and to shape its course. The sittings of the National Convention are public. 
Its official web page is being completed these days. 
The National Convention has met twice so far. Its third session ought to be 
summoned in January 2002 and it should link up on the summit in Laeken 
and assess its results from the Slovak point of view. 
In the matter of the European dimension of this debate we are, as well as 
other candidate countries in favor of the full participation of candidate 
countries in the discussion on the future of Europe, including the equal par-
ticipation in the European Convention on these issues that should start 
working by the beginning of 2002. Candidate countries expressed their will 
to take part equally in all stages of this debate already during the informal 
meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs which took place in Geneva in 
September this year. The full engagement of candidate countries into the 
debate on the future of the EU should be concerned as a legitimate re-
quirement as this debate will have direct effect on our national interests 
considering our integration ambitions. 
Identity 
One of the principal questions in the context of the European integration is 
the question of identity. National identity, European identity and their mu-
tual relationship. This problem has two aspects. 
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First, it is the so-called necessity to build the European identity. Let me 
disagree with this attitude, because if we want to build the European iden-
tity like something new, something artificial, the European integration will 
loose its meaning and the European Union will become artificial as well. I 
can demonstrate it on a concrete example though its essence was very con-
trary: disintegration. When the former Czech-Slovakia split, the reason was 
not to build the Slovak identity. On the contrary: the Slovak identity existed 
and was very strong. The establishment of the independent republic was 
just a form of the realization of this identity.  
In relation to European integration the economic dimension of the integra-
tion is sometimes exorbitantly emphasized. At the same time the results of 
the political sphere are omitted. It seems as if we have misjudged reasons 
with consequences 56 years after the end of the Second World War. In the 
Fifties of the past century, it was just the ambition to conciliate mortal 
enemies which led the Fathers of Europe to the idea of the European inte-
gration. The economic integration represented only one of the means to 
achieve this aim and not contrariwise.   
The number of those who can remember the cataclysm of the Second 
World War is decreasing and the threat of the communist expansion van-
ished as well. Sometimes it seems as if Europeans have forgotten to what 
they owe thanks for the fact that Europe is nowadays a continent of stabil-
ity, democracy, freedom and prosperity. I am therefore deeply convinced 
that there is not a lack of European identity in Europe, but there is a lack of 
an emotional basis for the conclusion of the European integration process. 
Another aspect of this problem lies in the concerns of loosing the national 
identity in the united Europe. The Slovaks lived for centuries in the Hun-
garian kingdom, later in the Hapsburg monarchy. In 1918, Slovakia became 
a part of former Slovakia-Slovakia. Despite of these facts the Slovak na-
tional identity has never vanished. On the contrary, eight years after the 
establishment of the independent Slovak Republic our citizens understand 
and accept the challenges of Europe and of today’s world. According to the 
latest polls more than 70% of our citizens are in favor of integration into 
the European Union.  
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A nation and a state are not the same entity. The sovereignty of a state is 
derived from the sovereignty of a nation and not contrariwise. A nation in 
Europe is the base of a nation state, but a nation is not a state and a state is 
not a nation. If a sovereign nation freely decides to realize its right to self-
determination in a new form, this decision must be respected and must not 
be called into question by national populism. Nowadays, the European Un-
ion is this new form. The European integration represents a new form of 
the realization of national interests in the conditions of the globalized 
world.  
If I have mentioned above a new form of the realization of national inter-
ests I do not mean creation of a European ”superstate”, the so-called 
“United States of Europe”. I mean a new form of international coexistence 
and cooperation in which a sovereign nation decides to transfer a part of its 
sovereignty to a supranational subject. The European Union will never be a 
state in the capacity as we know it today. On the other hand, contemporary 
nation states cannot rigorously insist on the status which they have today or 
they had in the past. Zbigniew Brzezinski expressed this idea in his speech 
during his visit to Slovakia a year ago, when he said that we were entering 
the era in which we would witness the end of the Vestfal system of the sov-
ereignty of nation states.  
The process of the European integration is a unique one. At present this 
process is entering the phase of political integration. It leads to the fact that 
terms like ”constitution”, ”federation” and other sensitive ones are emerg-
ing in the discussion. The application of exact terminology is a prerequisite 
for the avoidance of misunderstandings in each debate. On the other hand, 
terminological discrepancies could hamper the discussion on the matter of 
the problems that Europe faces today in order to remain fully competitive 
in the conditions of the globalized world and capable to take decisions and 
act in the conditions of an enlarged union. Nowadays, in this phase of the 
debate we should aim at finding the merit and define the content of the on-
going processes. I would like to emphasize the words of president Johannes 
Rau who in his ”plea for a European constitution” said that we had to dis-
cuss the substance rather than argue about terms, as it would be easier to 
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come to an agreement on the substance of what it had meant than on these 
terms. 
The European Constitution 
I have already mentioned that Slovakia created the National Convention for 
the purpose of debate on the future of the European Union, the aim of 
which is to work as a discussion forum and thus initiate a nation-wide dis-
cussion on these issues. At the last session there was a clear demand to 
keep the open character of the debate and not to seek for the consensus on 
each question at all costs. To the contrary, there was an opinion that the 
convention should state common positions only on minimum questions on 
which the members of the convention will find absolute concord. 
I have also mentioned that the National Convention has had two sittings so 
far. On the basis of the results of these sessions I can generalize some de-
veloping trends concerning the discussion on the future of Europe from the 
Slovak point of view. 
The Declaration on the Future of the European Union defined four basic 
issues of the debate on the future of the EU. I will try to adduce some re-
marks concerning these basic themes of this debate. 
Considering the necessity of bringing the Union as close as possible to the 
citizens, the simplification of the Founding Treaties seems to be one of the 
most important questions in the context of this debate. The European Union 
should provide its citizens with a document containing the definition of the 
values on which the Union is built and of the objectives of the Union as 
well as the arrangement of the basic relations concerning the function of 
the Union. This is a point where the simplification of the Founding Treaties 
is closely connected with the question of the ”European constitution”. This 
question is, in my opinion, the key question in the context of the future in-
tegration of Europe. The adoption of the European constitution will un-
doubtedly require a repression of many emotional and political prejudices. 
However, the transition of the European integration process to the phase of 
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the political union will beyond any doubt require such a political and legal 
document.  
How should this document look like? Short, clear and readable are the cri-
teria stated in the Declaration of Milan on a European Constitution adopted 
by three European think-tanks in November 2000. One can not do anything 
but agree with these criteria, since one of the main attributes of this docu-
ment should become transparency and one of the main functions making 
the relations in the Union clear as it is still being perceived by the citizens 
as a bureaucratic conglomerate administrated from Brussels.  
Finally, it is also in the interest of the Union itself to provide the citizens 
with a transparent model of basic relations and mechanisms of the EU and 
thereby achieve higher involvement of the citizens in European issues. I 
have mentioned above that I consider the European constitution as a key 
question of the debate. On the other hand, this question is, at the same time, 
the most sensitive one. Therefore I do not dare to say when there will be a 
sufficient political will in Europe to adopt such a document - regardless of 
either it will be called constitution or otherwise. However, I would like to 
emphasize another significant point of this document. I have mentioned 
above that in Europe there is a lack of emotional basis for the deepening of 
integration processes. A big leap in this context is to be the implementation 
of the Euro, which will soon replace twelve national currencies. The adop-
tion of the European constitution could signify a definitive breakthrough in 
this direction. The European constitution would be nothing less than the 
materialization of the European identity. The adoption of such a document 
could give Europe that emotional impetus I have mentioned above.  
The question on the content of the European constitution remains open as 
well. Another issue defined in the Declaration on the Future of the Euro-
pean Union automatically emerges in this context - the status of the Charter 
of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union. I suppose that just this 
Charter should become the important part of the European constitution. 
This would express the devotion of the EU to the protection of human 
rights and freedoms. Moreover, through the incorporation of the Charter to 
the European constitution the Charter would achieve legally binding status. 
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At the same time only such a status can provide the European citizens with 
an effective guarantee for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on the European level. In this context the question of the proce-
dural guarantor of the protection of human rights on the European level 
also emerges. A most natural solution of this question seems to be an ex-
tension of the jurisdiction of the European court of justice on this field. 
Another very important part of the European constitution seems to be a de-
limitation of the powers between the European union and the member 
states, which is also according the Declaration on the Future of the Euro-
pean Union another main issue of the debate. This part of the discussion is 
of immense importance for several reasons: 
a) the clear delimitation of the powers of the Union on one hand and the 
member states on the other hand would contribute towards increasing of 
transparency of the relations in the Union and thus bringing the Union 
closer to its citizens. 
b) the exact delimitation of powers would provide member states with 
guarantees for protection of national interests against excessive and unjusti-
fied Union influence and thus will become the main instrument of the pro-
tection of national identity. 
c) the clear delimitation of powers would create adequate space for more 
flexible and more effective European decision-making and acting. 
There are a lot of patterns for vertical division of powers. The ideal pattern 
for Europe could be the one which would explicitly define the exclusive 
powers of the Union completed with the general clause according to which 
everything that does not fall within the exclusive competence of the Euro-
pean Union should belong to the competence of the member states. Effec-
tiveness of the decision-making will probably require also the definition of 
the fields of shared competence, in which both the Union and the member 
states could take decisions. Which level of decision-making is competent in 
the concrete case should then be determined in accordance with the princi-
ple of subsidiarity. 
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In connection with the vertical division of powers, the regions and their 
status are sometimes mentioned, too. The principal problem in this context 
lies in the different status of the regions of Europe. Whereas the lands in 
Germany or in Austria are the member states of the federation, the regions 
in other member states (except Belgium) as well as in candidate countries 
are only administrative regions. It means that these regions are created by 
the central government which also defines their competencies. Therefore 
we can hardly expect that these states will be in favor of defining regional 
competencies on a European level. 
When speaking about the vertical division of powers, one cannot forget the 
horizontal division of powers. The Declaration on the Future of the Euro-
pean Union stated as one of the main issues within the Post-Nice process 
only the future role of the national parliaments in the European architec-
ture. However, in my opinion, this question must be solved in the wider 
context, including the consideration on the role of the European parliamen-
tarianism as a whole and the division of powers among the main European 
institutions, in particular in the framework of the triangle - Council, Com-
mission and European parliament. 
In consequence of the specific development of the European integration 
certain deformations occurred in particular between the legislation and exe-
cution. The speed of the transfer of decision making to the Council has not 
been followed by the growth of the competencies of the European parlia-
ment as the only directly elected European institution. Consequently legal 
acts at the European level are adopted in the Council consisting of the rep-
resentatives of the national executive power. This is the essence of what is 
called democratic deficit of the European institutions. Therefore the elimi-
nation of the democratic deficit will likely require the strengthening of the 
European parliament, not only the strengthening of the role of the national 
parliaments. 
Foreign and Security Policy 
Shortly after the beginning of the debate on the future of the EU, we all 
who deal with these issues, had to realize that this debate may not be re-
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duced only on the four questions defined in the Declaration on the Future 
of the European Union but it must remain open to other problems of 
Europe and the world.  
The events that happened in the United States two months ago indirectly 
defined another point to this discussion - common foreign and security pol-
icy and its further development. These events have united Europe more 
than ever before. Candidate countries share the common position of the 
European Union towards the fight against terrorism and in fact they act as 
if they were members of the European Union. 
The most frequent reaction to the events of September 11
th was the state-
ment that the world would never be the same again. What does it mean in 
the conditions of the EU and in wider relations of future development of 
the world? 
First and foremost, everybody had to realize the nature of the threats the 
world faces today and will face in the future. The traditional defense policy 
concentrated on the external enemy was overcome by the attack on the 
United States. Although the attack was organized from abroad, the fact is 
that the strike itself came from the heart of the USA. We all had to realize 
that the real enemy in the 21
st century is not standing on our borders. He 
might live in the neighboring flat. The frontiers between the internal and 
external security policy in this context have disappeared. The real defense 
and security policy in the 21
st century requires effective internal measures 
implemented and coordinated in the wide international cooperative frame-
work. In the conditions of the European Union suitable prerequisites are 
created for that. The Union should only use them. 
Another aspect in these relations consists in the responsibility of the EU for 
future development of the world. For centuries, Europe has been the centre 
of the world’s development, until it lost this position after two disastrous 
world wars. Therefore, when the common foreign and security policy of the 
EU was coming into being, the main intention of the EU was to regain its 
lost positions in the world and become a ”global player”. Today, when this 
policy is being developed, one must be aware of the European Union’s re-
sponsibility for the future arrangement of the world. 
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What the world needs now is political reconciliation and economic con-
solidation. The responsibility of the European Union lies in the fact that the 
EU must be an example and prove that it is possible. If the idea of Euro-
pean integration symbolizes something, it symbolizes these very values. 
After the Second World War the idea of the European integration suc-
ceeded in reconciliation of mortal enemies. Today, the idea of the European 
integration helps us to eliminate the last remainders of the Iron Curtain.  
Since their establishment, the USA have been the lighthouse of freedom 
and democracy for those who have been looking for these values. The 
European Union could become a lighthouse of reconciliation and progress 
in the 21
st century.  
The United Nations Organization proclaimed the year 2001 a year of dia-
logue among civilizations. At that time it could not have known what 
would happen in September 2001. European civilization is being united in 
the European Union. It is our common responsibility to successfully finish 
this process. The European Union could thereby become an example for 
other civilizations to find a common language and consequently become a 
subject of the dialogue among civilizations, a dialogue which could solve 
global problems. 
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The Case of Latvia 
The theme – the future of the Union – is of particular importance to all of 
us, both the current members and the newcomers. The very process of dis-
cussion helps us to develop a common vision of Europe. I fully support 
striving to make the Union more transparent, more equal, and more effi-
cient. Also, the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance with 
a proposal to involve candidate member states into the Lisbon process 
serves this purpose.  
In March 2001, the Swedish EU presidency invited us to take part in a dis-
cussion on the future of the EU. The presidency did a great job launching 
this wide-ranging debate of the scale and substance experienced never be-
fore. Indeed, the time was ripe for such debates. The new century, en-
largement and globalization have brought the development of Europe to the 
point from which simple linear movement is no longer possible. A logical 
need has arisen for Europeans - both candidate and member countries - to 
use the advantages and minimize the negative consequences of global-
ization. The solution lies in increasing competitiveness along with preser-
vation of one's individuality in the conditions of globalization. A need has 
emerged once again to consider and discuss the meaning and goals of the 
integration. The new Europe strives for democratic legitimacy on the 
grounds of a broad public support in all areas, not least the one touching 
upon the future of a common Europe.  
One might think that Latvia currently has only one important task – to 
complete negotiations as soon as possible and to be good enough to join the 
EU. Latvia is highly motivated and determined to join the EU. However, 
we are acceding not because of the accession itself. We want to see Europe 
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as an effective and competitive actor playing on the global scale and Latvia 
as a deeply integrated part of it. I am confident that Latvia's aspirations to 
become a member of the EU stem from the fundamental interests of our 
society and nation. We integrate into the EU in order to realize the interests 
of our society. The EU is something more than a purely economic concept. 
The common values and ideals offer the most solid foundations for creating 
a family of stable, secure and prosperous nations. By pursuing this road we 
consolidate our national independence, democracy and advance towards 
public welfare and security. In this way, we make the influence of Latvia in 
the international arena stronger while preserving our cultural identity and 
the Latvian language.  
It is with great interest that we follow the launched debate on Europe’s fu-
ture and we would like to use Europe’s historical opportunity by actively 
contributing to this debate. The idea of Europe can only develop by making 
new contributions. The very process of discussions is assisting to crystalliz-
ing the common vision of Europe.  
As we know, the history of the European Union began with close economic 
cooperation in the middle of the twentieth century. It meant the triumph of 
integration over the system of balance of power in Europe and marked the 
end of threats of war. The speed and scale of the construction of a new 
Europe over decades surprises positively with dynamics. While in 1951 six 
countries initiated integration, in 1995 it already embraced 15 members and 
in the predictable future their number may grow to 30 member countries. 
The period between each new EU treaty also becomes shorter and shorter. 
While almost 30 years elapsed between the Rome Treaties and the amend-
ments to these treaties by the 1986 Single European Act, Maastricht Treaty 
and Amsterdam Treaty were separated by six years and two years passed 
between Amsterdam and Nice. And whether also the political integration 
will be the future of the European Union, which implies a common foreign 
policy and defense, a European Government, a European Constitution, will 
become clear at the EU Intergovernmental Conference in 2004. The devel-
opment of the EU is a continuous process. 
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The existence and development of the EU has shown that cooperation is the 
most efficient method of protecting their national interests. But nobody can 
tell for sure, yet, what the EU will look like in 10-15 years. As the leaders 
of the EU member countries outline the vision of the future of Europe, they 
talk about a European Federation with a two-house parliament, a European 
government and constitution. Others on their turn insist that intergovern-
mental cooperation should go on and representatives of national parlia-
ments should take part in the EU councils. However, despite of these con-
tradictory viewpoints, we have to strive for a common vision. The EU is 
not a frozen union. Until now the EU has already asserted its ability to cre-
ate and implement its future vision – in 1986 member countries came to an 
agreement on the internal market as of 1992 and in 1991 they decided that 
a single currency would be in circulation as of 2002. The success of every 
project is primarily based on the ability to visualize the possible aspects of 
the future development. 
The post-Nice process and EU enlargement are two very closely inter-
linked issues. Both have apparent potential to play a great role in the form-
ing of public opinion in the member countries and the candidate countries. 
If we want to succeed we should send clear and strong political signals to 
our people. Therefore Latvia proposes that both member states and candi-
date states could jointly elaborate on a "Declaration on the Political Future 
of Europe" before launching the next IGC. To my mind, common under-
standing of our common future is the very basis for fortune – strength is in 
unity. The adoption of this declaration would contribute to a more foresee-
able result at the IGC 2004. Not so long ago, the EU already experienced a 
situation when all the main decisions were taken in the last night. I would 
say that we need a process which is open and clear and no “last night 
shock” in the IGC 2004 is possible.  
The citizens of Latvia will have to vote for the accession to the European 
Union. Therefore it is of crucial importance to explain to the public what, 
why and how the European Union is. Most members and candidates have 
already launched broad national debates. Active participation in the public 
debate is needed because we do not talk about an abstract future of an ab-
stract Europe but a very concrete future of Latvia, Poland, the Czech Re-
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public as well as all the other countries in Europe. The presidency initiative 
served as a stimulus for the Latvian government to initiate a debate on 
Europe’s future in broad society. We are convinced that a greater public 
involvement will foster greater support for both - the idea of a common Eu-
rope and enlargement. The idea of integration is alive only if it enjoys 
public support. For us the public opinion in Latvia on everything that per-
tains to the European Union is extremely important. We must talk all to-
gether actively about what the EU is today and what Latvia wishes the fu-
ture of the EU to be because wrong assumptions often spring from lack of 
knowledge. In the very beginning of May, an active discussion on the EU 
was launched on the Internet portal "Delfi". It turned out that the public 
debate on Europe’s future reflects the same fears which come up when 
people are asked if they would vote for accession to the EU. Surprisingly 
quite similar fears are expressed by the societies of member states. People 
claim that once the possibility to join a union arises, the logical question 
emerges whether one can leave it, too. The EU member countries have de-
mocratic systems that irrespective of the nature of the existing government 
can replace it by peaceful means through the majority of people's vote in 
fair and transparent elections.  A lot of concern might be eliminated by in-
forming the society and fostering debate. People are concerned about the 
bureaucratization and lack of openness in the EU, about what will happen 
to our independence, what will happen to our national identity and culture. 
This almost always stems from lack of information and fear of changes.  
The declaration adopted in the EU Nice summit on the future of the Euro-
pean Union mentions the main issues to be discussed: How to share compe-
tence between the EU and member countries? Should the Charter on Fun-
damental Rights have legal status? How to make the EU treaties 
understandable while not changing their essence? What to do with national 
parliaments?   
We, being a future member country, have legitimate rights and duties to-
gether with the governments of Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Spain and all 
other member countries to make decisions pertaining to our future in 
Europe. A need has emerged for a framework of discussion, such as a con-
vention that would engage parliaments, NGOs and academic circles in a 
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comprehensive and open discussion on the development of the European 
idea. It would present an opportunity to embrace the opinion of wide circles 
of public. Only those decisions that are made in this way will enjoy the 
necessary public support. However, the final decisions are to be made in 
the traditional Intergovernmental Conference. We welcome the decision of 
the General Affairs Council of October 8, 2001 about the representation of 
the candidate states in the convention. We hope that at the Laeken EU 
summit the candidates will be given the voting rights. Granting the candi-
dates with voting rights the current member states would show genuine de-
termination not only to treat the EU candidate states as equal partners but to 
have them as members of the club as soon as possible.  
Here, I would like to reflect only on some issues that seems of importance 
to me. 
Euro-skeptics maintain that the work and bureaucracy of the EU are not 
transparent. Indeed, the system of EU treaties is very complicated. Even 
lawyers of member countries admit it. A clear need has emerged to formu-
late a logically structured text that the EU citizens would be able to under-
stand. It is indeed not easy to accept what is difficult to understand. Few of 
us would buy a car that requires reading thousands of pages of instructions 
before driving, although it does not mean at all that it is a bad car. The EU 
legislation is 80.000 pages long. The simpler the treaties, the easier to un-
derstand the principles of the operation of the EU.  
One of our common goals is to make the EU more people-friendly which 
means making it more transparent, more efficient and more understandable 
to its citizens. These issues were touched also in the European Commis-
sion’s White Paper on European Governance. The EU is not a Union of 
lawyers. Instead, it is a Union of citizens. We should search for the possi-
bilities how to make the link between the EU and the citizens much 
stronger. Perhaps, replacing the “top-down“ approach with a “bottom-up“ 
approach would be the possible solution.  
The replacement of the founding treaties by a "European Constitution" has 
been discussed more and more seriously over the recent years. I regard the 
elaboration of a constitutional treaty of the European Union that would de-
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scribe such fields as the rights of the EU citizens and the institutional struc-
ture of the EU as a logical step over the long period within the European 
integration process.  
The opponents of European integration claim that it would not be possible 
for people to directly influence the decision-making process of the EU. 
There are indications that European citizens do not feel attached to the EU. 
Despite electing the European Parliament they somehow do not feel that 
special link between them and the Union. We remember the low turnout of 
the last elections of the European Parliament. In my opinion, the feeling 
that citizens cannot directly influence decision-making results from the in-
sufficient role of national parliaments in the EU. By taking part in national 
parliamentary elections, each citizen realizes his or her opportunity to in-
fluence the development of his or her nation. I believe that the issue of 
greater involvement of citizens in the EU processes can be reasonably ad-
dressed by strengthening the role of national parliaments. It would assure 
citizens that their national interests are taken into account in EU decision-
making. This we consider an issue of national importance. We are prepared 
to actively contribute to seek the institutional arrangements to make it come 
true. 
The euroskeptics are keen on pointing out that Brussels will decide every-
thing for us and that it has excessive authority, that upon accession we shall 
be forced to eat sauerkraut and Brussels sprouts with our goose on Martin's 
Day. It is not like this at all. The European Union is not a centralized state. 
It is "only" a transnational organization to which its member countries have 
delegated a part of their competence. The elaboration and implementation 
of the entire national policy is and will remain our business except for 
fields that we shall delegate to the EU. And even then we shall determine 
the way these common policies will be implemented in our country. For 
example, in education: while the EU provides guidelines for mutual recog-
nition of university degrees we shall always decide ourselves for how long 
and what subjects shall be taught in our schools and universities. Also after 
the accession to the EU, Latvia will decide whether to transfer specific 
policies to the EU. Such decisions require the unanimous vote of all mem-
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ber countries. It precludes making decisions that essentially influence our 
life without our participation. 
The current debate on the future outlook of the EU shows that there is no 
single understanding of the meaning of the term federalism. “There are as 
many viewpoints as there are men.” This also applies to the use of the term 
‘federalism’ in the EU context. Everybody attaches his own meaning to this 
term. In our opinion, the term ‘federalism’ means decentralization, subsidi-
arity and multi-level governance and not centralization of powers. When 
we use the term European Federation, it must not be understood as Euro-
pean supranational state. We can wholly agree with the concept of the 
European Union as a federation of national states. Latvia understands the 
European Federation as a federation of independent national states. You 
must agree that the strength of the EU lies in its diversity. National states 
join forces for a common good. When speaking about the term federation 
and federal Europe, we should remember that the EU already now looks 
and acts like a federation. When we take the definition of the term federa-
tion, the following conclusions can be made – firstly, already now the citi-
zens of the EU have a double citizenship – that of each member state and 
that of the Union, which at the same time is a single citizenship; secondly, 
each member state has its national constitution and at the same time the EU 
also is moving towards a constitution or, to be more precise, the Constitu-
tional Treaty; thirdly, from the next year the citizens of member states will 
have the single currency - Euro – in their hands; fourthly, every member 
state can make legislation that only works within a particular state and at 
the same time the EU can make legislation that is binding for all member 
states. So we can conclude that the EU is neither a pure international or-
ganization, or a community of totally independent states, nor a suprana-
tional state. The EU is a fusion both with supranational and intergovern-
mental elements.  
From the very beginnings the history of the European Union has been a 
history of development, a history of integration development. Could the 
development have a finality? Definitely not. The integration of the Euro-
pean Union is the answer to challenges of globalization and to changes it 
brings. The development and integration are never-ending ones. And the 
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more we reflect, the more ideas we provide for a fruitful further debate on 
the development of European idea. As Sir Winston Churchill once said: 
“The empires of the future are the empires of the mind.” 
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